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Expert Leaders in a Fast-Moving Environment 
 
By Amanda Goodall and Ganna Pogrebna 
 
 
Abstract  
 
This study explores the effects of leaders in an iconic, high-technology, turbulent 
industry. We analyse 62 years of objective performance data from one of the world's 
most competitive sectors (Formula One competition).  The study’s findings provide 
strong support for an ‘expert leader hypothesis’.  The most successful leaders are 
disproportionately those who started as drivers or mechanics (not as general 
managers or university graduates in engineering). Moreover, within the sub-sample 
of former drivers, it is those who had the longest driving careers who went on to 
become the most effective leaders.  Remarkably, the leader’s former experience as a 
competitive driver is a better predictor of current organizational performance than 
the driving experience of the person who is actually driving for the team.  The study’s 
expert-leader findings are consistent with the hypothesis that longitudinal 
performance improves when a leader’s knowledge and expertise correlate with an 
organization’s core business activity. 
 
 
Keywords: expert leaders, leadership, organizational performance, high-tech teams. 
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1. Introduction  
A growing research literature examines the influence of leaders upon organizational 
performance and one notable new strand tries to understand the role of ‘expert 
leaders’.  Such work has attempted to separate CEO effects from industry or firm 
effects to calculate the explanatory power of leaders and their characteristics (e.g. 
Thomas 1988; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Waldman & Yammarino, 1999; 
Mumford, Scott, Gaddis, & Strange, 2002; Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Jones and Olken 
2005; Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez and Wolfenzon 2007; Yukl, 2008; Mackey, 2008; 
Goodall 2009a; Souder, Simsek & Johnson, 2012; Dezs & Ross, 2012; Nohe, 
Michaelis, Menges, Zhang, & Sonntag, 2013).   To estimate leaders’ effects in an 
exact way within real-world settings is known to be problematic (Antonakis, 
Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010, Blettner, Chaddad and Bettis, 2012); it is not 
possible, outside a laboratory, to randomly assign a leader to an organization.  In this 
area of social science, therefore, the discovery of persuasive conclusions has to rest, 
at least in large part, on the availability of error-free observational data and on truly 
consistent replication across a wide range of settings. 
 
The dataset in this study offers researchers a number of unusual advantages.  One 
virtue of the setting is that it is representative of an industry type of increasing 
importance in the global economy, namely, one where there is extreme 
technological change and in which highly skilled individuals work together in a 
turbulent setting of ruthless world-class competition.  It is possible, in this dataset, to 
observe every leader and the complete history of the chosen industry.  The industry 
has the valuable feature that it provides exact and objective data on the 
performance of each leader’s organization in each year.  Therefore, the 
measurement error in our outcome variables should be zero.  Moreover, we also 
have, within the dataset, the ability to link organizational success today to the 
leader’s characteristics measured when those leaders were much younger.  Finally, 
the dataset is longitudinal, and is rich enough that we are able to control, in later 
regression equations, for a range of other independent influences on organizational 
success.  
 
The focus in this study is on leadership and performance in the high-technology 
industry of Formula One.  The dataset, which we constructed partly by hand, makes 
it possible to identify and classify every leader in the six decades between 1950 and 
2011, and, by using the unambiguous and homogeneous performance measures that 
are feasible in only rare settings like Formula One, we can in principle estimate the 
effects of different leader-types on organizational performance. Later analysis uses a 
range of econometric methods -- ones specifically chosen to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity and allow for multiple control variables -- to determine the relation 
between accumulated leader expertise and later Formula One team results. 
 
The detailed purposes of the study are twofold.  First, in this new setting we probe 
the ‘expert-leader’ hypothesis that leader characteristics that most closely align with 
the core business activity of the organization are associated, over time, with better 
performance.  Second, in a unique check, we are able to examine the consequences 
of leaders for the performance of key followers; specifically, we can isolate the effect 
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that different leaders have on the performance of their Formula One drivers.   To 
make progress on these issues we first identify the technical background from which 
each leader emerged.  We then test whether the leader-characteristics measured 
decades earlier that most closely align with the core business activity of the 
organization are associated with better performance in the current year.  We are 
careful to control for a set of other influences on performance. 
 
Why is Formula One (hereafter F1) an important industry to study?  One pragmatic 
reason is that it is estimated to be worth annually approximately $6 billion (Sylt & 
Reid, 2011), with earnings coming from two main sources, sponsorship from major 
firms, and television revenues.  F1 is also interesting intellectually because it is as 
much a competition for new technologies as it is for driving fast. The technological 
spillovers are numerous: they include anti-lock braking system (ABS), environmental 
technologies such as energy storage for use in cars, trains and soon airplanes, ultra-
light carbon-fibre, real-time data monitoring systems, among many others.  F1 
constructors (e.g. Ferrari, Williams, McLaren, etc.) are medium sized companies that 
employ on average around 400 people.  Constructors contract with numerous auto 
component suppliers because they are obliged to build their own race car chassis, 
and often also engines (Castellucci and Ertug, 2010).   
 
A further reason to study the industry is because it is subject to a great deal of 
regulatory turbulence.  The Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA) imposes 
strict conditions that change annually, on all aspects of F1 (the teams, technology, 
resources, track, tires, drivers, etc.).  A link between regulation and innovation has 
been well documented (see Stewart 2010 for a review).  This relationship is 
embodied in F1; regulation is unambiguously associated with innovation and 
performance (Jenkins, 2004; Jenkins, Pasternak, & West, 2007; Khanna, Kartik, 
Varma, & Lane. 2003; Jenkins 2010; Aversa, 2013; Marino, Aversa, Mesquita & 
Anand, 2013), and regulatory compliance produces a level playing field for all 
competing teams.  Indeed, rule changes are sometimes made with the intention of 
curtailing the dominance of one team, for example, with Ferrari and Michael 
Schumacher in 2003 (Hoisl 2011).   
 
The evidence presented later reveals a strong association between having driven 
competitively and leading successfully: F1 constructors headed by former racing 
drivers produce the best results. We also demonstrate that among the sub-sample of 
drivers it is those with the longest driving careers who go on to make the best 
leaders (titled principals).  Our central finding is not merely a simple bivariate 
pattern.  The results hold when we control for the racing brand of the constructor 
team, the exact year of competition, the number of competitor cars in each race, and 
the circuits where Grand Prix take place.  On the suggestion of referees, moreover, 
we are also able to show that the key result goes through even after adjustment for 
team income (see Appendix 2: the necessary data on income are only publicly 
available for a recent subset of years).  Second, when we examine the effect that 
different leaders have on their key workers -- for example the current F1 drivers -- 
we additionally find that the driving experience of the leader matters as much to 
performance as the F1 driving experience of the current team driver.  There is little 
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difference in performance when pairing an experienced driver-leader with either an 
experienced F1 driver or with a rookie driver; in contrast, a principal with no racing 
experience is apparently associated with bad performance no matter how much F1 
racing the team driver has done.   
 
 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
The idea of expert leaders, discussed further in this paper, arose from previous work 
that identified a link between the core business knowledge held by a leader and 
organizational performance.  Core business is defined as the primary activity that is 
the organization’s main source of success and profits.  Studies that focus on the core-
business knowledge and technical expertise of leaders have become more relevant 
because of recent evidence that major firms have moved away from hiring CEOs who 
might be considered experts or specialists (with technical degrees), towards instead 
the selection of leaders who are generalist managers (Frydman, 2007; Bertrand, 
2009).    
 
The suggestion that leaders and followers should share technical expertise has been 
studied within the context of creativity (e.g. Thamin & Gemmill 1974; Basadur, 
Runco, & Vega 2000; McAuley, Duberley & Cohen, 2000).  Mumford, Scott, Gaddis, & 
Strange (2002) summarized such findings: they reported, first, that both technical 
and creative problem-solving skills are necessary when leading creative individuals; 
this combination informs how leaders create an appropriate work structure, and 
gives them credibility which enhances a leader’s influence (2002, p. 712).   Second, 
they argued that the evaluation of creative people and their ideas is best done by 
individuals who share their competencies.  Third, leaders who share the same 
creative and technical perspective and motivation as their followers can 
communicate more clearly; finally, in relation to performance, they can better 
articulate the needs and goals of the organization (Mumford et al., 2002).  In a study 
of research institutes, Andrews and Farris (1967) found that the best predictor of a 
researcher’s creative performance was the leader’s level of technical ability as 
compared with other factors including motivating others, maintaining group 
relationships, and the amount of autonomy granted to staff.  These results were 
replicated by Barnowe (1975).  
   
The studies summarized in Mumford et al. (2002) differ from our own.  Importantly, 
they almost all used cross-sectional data at a single point in time (the one exception 
is Farris 1969 who had two points in time).  Our study uses longitudinal data.  We are 
also able to compare leader-characteristics against more objectively measured 
performance outcomes, and we can include a unique interaction analysis where it is 
possible to examine the effect of different leader-types on the performance of key 
followers.   
 
The literature on Upper Echelons (UE) theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and CEO 
origin is also related to the ideas of expert leaders.  UE theory suggests that top 
managers make strategic choices that are reflections of their own values and 
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cognitions.  However, UE theory places greatest emphasis on the characteristics of 
the top management team, whereas our work isolates the leader.    
 
Research on the origin of a CEO has identified a link between firm performance, 
among other outcomes, and whether the head was hired from outside the firm, or 
instead promoted from within, and if so, from which domain (see Kesner & Dalton, 
1994; Shen & Cannella, 2002; Wiersema, 1995; Zajac, 1990; Karaevli, 2007; Zhang & 
Rajagopalan, 2004; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2010).  There is evidence that the number 
of outsider CEO hires have risen since the early 1990s (Lucier, Schuyt & Handa, 
2003); a recent study of CEO succession in the world’s largest 2,500 public 
companies revealed that in 2011 twenty-two percent of new CEOs came from 
outside their organization, compared to fourteen percent in 2007 (Booz & Co, 2011).  
Booz & Co (2011) showed that insider CEOs tend to serve for longer terms, and, that 
when they do retire, they leave their companies with higher shareholder returns 
compared with outsider CEOs (4.4 percent above the regional market index, as 
compared with 0.5 percent higher return).  Much of the literature that examined 
insider and outsider CEOs revealed that different outcomes may be beneficial under 
different conditions -- dependent upon, for example, pre or post-succession firm 
performance, during periods of environmental munificence or turbulence, the level 
of strategic change that is introduced, and so on (Harris & Helfat, 1997; Karaevli, 
2007; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2010).  New work on the expert leader hypothesis has 
been done in more-specialized settings (e.g. Goodall, 2009a,b; Goodall, 2011; 
Goodall, Kahn & Oswald, 2011).    
 
In this paper we ask: when the core business activity of the firm aligns with the 
expertise of the leader, does that generate better organization performance?  In 
Formula One, the core business is to win the Championship by gaining points in 
Grand Prix races.  In our data, four leader-types are found: those who were formerly 
mechanics; those who were engineers (with degrees); former racing drivers; and, 
finally, individuals who were managers from other industries. Our performance data 
are on podium positions (that is, teams coming number 1-3 in a race).  Podium 
places award a team the highest number of points, when compared to finishing 
lower down on a race day, and allow different teams to be compared in a consistent 
way.   
 
Hypothesis 1: Alignment between the expert knowledge held by the leader and the 
organization’s core business activity is associated with better performance. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Former racing drivers make the best leaders of F1 teams.     
 
Hypothesis 3: The effect on performance of the former driving experience of the 
leader is larger than the effect of the driving experience of the current driver.  
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3. Data and basic statistics  
 
3.1 Formula One constructors 
  
The dataset covers the performance of every team in every Grand Prix season since 
the industry began.  This is for six decades of the F1 World Constructors’ 
Championship between 1950 and 2011 (62 seasons) resulting in a total of 19,536 car 
entries in 858 races.  We also collected background information about leaders of all 
F1 constructors (e.g. Ferrari, McLaren, Williams, Mercedes, etc.) for the same time 
period.  The dataset enables us to measure exact organizational performance (over a 
62 year period), and provides detailed measures of leader characteristics.   
 
There are 106 constructor teams in these historical data.  Since 1981, constructors 
have been obliged to build their own race car chassis, though not their engines.  The 
goal of an F1 constructor is to maximize the number of points gained in races.  In 
recent years each team entered two cars in consecutive races every year.  
Championship points are awarded based on the final position of each car at the end 
of the race (the first car wins the largest number of points, with other race points 
assigned, in a declining way, down to tenth position).  Constructor teams are 
comparable in size.  Identical criteria are applied to measure their performance.   
 
We collected data on: the starting and final position of all cars that participated in 
each race; the constructor teams; their leaders’ names, personal information and 
background; the drivers’ personal information and background; and information 
about each race circuit.  For a small number of years, information is also available on 
team budgets.  The data were compiled from two main sources.  For car entries, 
circuit, constructor, driver, as well as other detailed Grand Prix race information, we 
used the FORIX online database of Autosport magazine accessible on 
http://forix.autosport.com.  The names and background information on each team 
leader were taken from the Grand Prix Encyclopedia website 
http://www.grandprix.com.1 
 
In contrast to many industries where agents have greatly varying size and output, F1 
constructor teams are fairly homogeneous in their size, capabilities, and 
approximate productivity.  These characteristics make it scientifically a valuable 
industry for study.  The higher is the position of the car in the final grid, the more 
points are awarded to its constructor team. Teams’ common motivation means that 
relative comparison of teams’ performance can be more exact than in settings where 
different companies make different products: the setting offers an unusual 
opportunity to compare organizations in a precise way.  In addition, the core work-
teams in F1 are relatively small (average of 400), which arguably allows a natural and 
suitable background against which to begin to try to understand the influence of 
leaders.   
                                                 
1
 In some cases, when more detailed information for any particular leader was required, we have 
double-checked biographical information with information recorded in official biographies of leaders 
who currently hold positions on TV or in the Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile (FIA) – the 
F1 governing organization, and sometimes on Wikipedia. 
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In each racing season the number of constructor teams in the Championship can 
differ.  For example, 21 teams competed in 1960, while only 12 were in the 
Championship in 2011. The decline in the number of competing teams seems 
primarily due to the cost associated with the sport which has increased over the 
years.  If in 1950s and 1960s amateur mechanics could enter their self-made cars 
into races, current race car manufacturing requires long-term R&D investments and 
expensive testing, which is affordable only through a narrow circle of sponsors.  The 
budgets of constructor teams are largely secret.  Most of the money is spent on 
technology which contributes a great deal to a team’s winning prospects (Read 1997, 
Wright 2001, Jenkins 2010).  The R&D investment in F1 eventually shows up as new 
technologies in automobiles that the public drive.  
   
3.2 The leaders (independent variable) 
Leaders of constructor teams in F1, called principals, operate in a skilled and stressful 
environment which requires quick decision-making.  The role of the leader in F1 is to 
run the team.  Some differences exist in responsibilities between constructor teams; 
however, it is usual for the team leader to determine the long-term strategy of the 
constructor, to control technical matters, and to make the majority of financial 
decisions.  Leaders also oversee the selection of drivers, who compete for their 
teams, and have a final say in making tactical decisions during each race.  Some 
principals -- for example Frank Williams of Williams or Tony Fernandes of Team Lotus 
-- own and run their own teams.  Owner-leaders have extensive powers.  In other 
cases, principals are hired by owners to manage their teams.  Such is the relationship 
between the beverage company Red Bull and principal Christian Horner.  With large 
automobile manufacturers involved in racing, for example Mercedes, Renault and 
Ferrari, it is usual for a principal to be appointed, although their direct powers and 
responsibilities may vary across teams.   
 
From our data, four types of leaders emerged.  The taxonomy is as follows. 
 
Managers typically spent most of their careers in business; they moved to F1 from a 
different (and often unrelated) industry.  Manager-leaders tend not to have 
experience or education in car making or mechanical engineering or a connected 
field.  They are also more likely to become involved in the industry relatively late in 
their careers.   
 
Driver is assigned to leaders who competed in competitive racing (F1 and other 
competitions) as racing drivers, often from an early age (around 6-8 years old).  Such 
leaders often started in Go-kart racing and then moved to professional racing by 
their early 20s.  It is common for drivers to be familiar with the technical side of car 
making, as well as with mechanical aspects of car repairing, even though they do not 
have degrees in mechanical engineering or a related field.  Drivers are usually the 
highest paid among team members.  
 
Mechanics are those with practical technical experience in car making and 
mechanical repair.  They tend not to have driven competitively, nor have they a 
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degree in mechanical engineering or a related field.  Mechanics often spent many 
years in automobile racing.   
 
Finally, the term engineer is assigned to those with degrees in mechanical 
engineering.  This is only an educational classification.  It is does not imply that the 
individuals are or were involved in practical engineering matters within the racing 
organization.  The information comes from their CVs.    
 
Using this broad classification, leaders are fairly evenly distributed across the four 
background groups. More precisely, in the history of the industry there were 42 
(29.8%) managers, 35 (24.8%) drivers, 31 (22.0%) mechanics, and 33 (23.4%) 
engineers.  All leaders in our data were male.2 
 
Despite what might be thought the possibility of ambiguity in leaders’ classification, 
such cases are rare.  For example, only 6 leaders out of the 141 had experience as 
both a driver and a mechanic.  Several leaders had either multi-level experience or 
several industry experiences.  In the few cases of doubt, leaders were assigned to 
their type according to the highest level of knowledge and primary area of activity.   
 
We collected the population of entries into F1 World Constructors’ Championship.  
Some minor omissions were inevitable.   All team executives listed by the team as 
‘principal of the racing team’ or ‘team principal’ could be identified as team leaders.  
Some teams in F1 history, however, were managed by several executives, i.e., by 
collective leaders.  Since the focus of this paper is on individual leaders, we excluded 
those collective leaders from consideration (29 collective leaders, 1,351 car entries).  
In two further cases we were unable to identify team leaders or locate their 
biographical information.  These observations were also excluded (460 car entries).  
The resulting dataset, therefore, contains information on 141 individual leaders who 
at different points of their lives represented 106 constructor teams and entered 
17,725 cars into F1 World Constructors’ Championship. 
 
3.3 Grand Prix (dependent variable) 
The number of races increased in a secular way from 7 in 1950 to 19 in 2011.  As 
would be expected, a myriad of regulations apply in F1 to engine and chassis design, 
tires, tactics allowed by drivers and so on; noticeably, these rules sometimes 
changed from one season to the next3. This does not interfere with our statistical 
inference because the changed rules applied to every team in each championship.  In 
the later econometric analysis, we control for the year of competition and therefore 
take into account these technical alterations from season to season. 
F1 constructor teams’ profits come from advertising and TV revenue.4  F1 is the most 
widely watched sport after the Olympics and Football’s World Cup, with over 500 
million TV viewers in 20125.  A higher finishing position, primarily a podium (first to 
third), generates more sponsorship and TV income.   Increasingly, modern teams are 
                                                 
2
 This is due to the fact that, until the year 2012, women never led F1 teams.   
3
 Jenkins (2010) provides a detailed summary of these changes and their impact on F1 technology. 
4
 See Formula Money website www.formulamoney.com for more details. 
5
 Christian Sylt, theguardian.com, Friday 15 February 2013. 
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raising money from the development of F1 technologies that spill-over into other 
industries (McLaren have an associated company, Applied Technologies, as do 
Williams).   
 
Table 1 (see next page) summarises the different championship point systems which 
have existed in F1 between 1950 and 2011.  
 
Table 1: The relationship between F1 Champion points and the final position of 
cars  
 
 
Championship point system  
Final 
position 
1950-
1959 
1960 
1961-
1990 
1991-
2002 
2003-
2009 
2010-
2011 
1950-
2011 
(averages) 
1st 8 8 9 10 10 25 11.7 
2nd 6 6 6 6 8 18 8.3 
3rd 4 4 4 4 6 15 6.2 
4th 3 3 3 3 5 12 4.8 
5th 2 2 2 2 4 10 3.7 
6th 0 1 1 1 3 8 2.3 
7th 0 0 0 0 2 6 1.3 
8th 0 0 0 0 1 4 0.8 
9th 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.3 
10th 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.2 
 
 
To allow a consistent measure of performance in the econometric analysis, we 
therefore use the relative final positions of cars in the race (instead of the number of 
obtained points).  Since most points are awarded for podium positions (that is, for 
finishing 1, 2 and 3 in a particular race), we concentrate on winners of podium 
positions for each race. Using data on podiums also helps us to have a measure of 
success which is stable through the years of the industry.  
 
3.4 Control variables 
The regression analysis includes variables for other factors that may influence 
performance.  We include controls for each race circuit (which may affect race 
performance due to a specific track shape or weather conditions).  There are 71 race 
circuits in the dataset.  Second, as mentioned above, a control is included for each 
year of competition (1950-2011); this adjusts for annual differences in the rules and 
regulations, which are factors that make F1 such a turbulent environment in which 
to compete.  Third, we adjust for the number of cars competing in each race, 
because those numbers affect competitive pressure.   
 
Finally, we control for each constructor’s brand by allowing for team fixed effects.  
This is a particularly important feature of the analysis.  Some constructors perform 
consistently better than others and that fact has to be incorporated into the 
estimation.  For example, it might be that Ferrari or McLaren often outperform 
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others not because they have successful leaders but because they have a long 
history of competing in F1 and thus traditionally had better facilities, more 
sponsorship money, intense public support, and highly experienced human 
resources.  To calculate the influence of leaders, we need to control for these 
background differences.  In the econometric analysis, therefore, a separate variable 
is included for each constructor brand (one for Ferrari, one for Red Bull, one for 
McLaren, etc.).  
 
 It might be expected that the amount of money each constructor spends would 
have an impact on outcomes.  Unfortunately, teams do not release information 
about their budgets.  Nevertheless, it has been possible for us to locate teams’ 
financial investment for a small number of years.  We include these results in a 
separate regression table in Appendix 2.  Importantly, the table shows that inclusion 
of constructor money does not affect our key findings about leader type (see 
Appendix 2). 
 
Explanatory variables used in our regression analysis are summarised in Table 2.   
 
 
       Table 2: Explanatory variables in the regression equations* 
Explanatory variable Description 
CONSTANT Constant 
MANAGER 1 if the leader is classified as manager; 0 otherwise 
DRIVER 1 if the leader is classified as driver; 0 otherwise 
MECHANIC 1 if leader is classified as mechanic; 0 otherwise 
ENGINEER 1 if the leader is classified as engineer; 0 otherwise 
CIRCUIT Each Grand Prix circuit has a different dummy  
YEAR Each year has a different dummy 
TEAM Each F1 constructor team has a dummy 
# CARS Number of cars qualified to race in any particular race 
 
*All executives listed by the team as ‘principal of the racing team’ or ‘team principal’ 
are identified as team leaders.  Those identified as having collective team leaders 
(more than one person) are excluded (29 leaders, 1,351 car entries).  We also 
excluded 460 car entries in cases where we were unable to identify leaders.   
 
Descriptive statistics  
Summary statistics are presented in Table 3.  They show that between 1950 and 
2011 the highest numbers of cars were entered by constructor teams led by former 
mechanics (7,456), which is explained by a statistical over-representation of 
mechanics in the early years of famous teams.  The statistics reveal that podium 
frequency (i.e., winning a first, second or third place in a race) and average wins 
frequency (i.e., coming first in a race) are more prevalent among teams headed by 
drivers and mechanics as compared with managers or engineers.  Drivers and 
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mechanics also have higher average pole frequencies (finishing first in the qualifying, 
and, as a result, starting the race at the very front of the grid) and average fastest lap 
(showing the fastest time in the race on any given lap). 
 
Table 3: Summary statistics of Formula 1 World Constructors’ Championship 1950-
2011 
Leaders’ 
type 
Number 
of 
leaders 
Number 
of 
cars 
Average 
podium 
frequency 
Average 
win 
frequency 
Average 
pole 
frequency 
Average 
fastest lap 
frequency 
Managers 42 3,498 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Drivers 35 2,779 0.17 0.07 0.07 0.06 
Mechanics 31 7,456 0.16 0.06 0.05 0.06 
Engineers 33 3,992 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Total 141 17,725 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 
 
Figure 1: Average podium frequency (1-3) and win frequency of F1 leaders who 
were drivers or machanics (DriverMech) compared with leaders who were 
managers or engineers (ManagerEng) 
 
 
*Results of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test show that the differences between win 
frequencies and podium frequencies of leaders classified as drivers or mechanics versus 
leaders classified as managers or engineers are statistically significant. The Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney z-statistics for podiums is equal to -12.509 (prob<0.0001). The Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney z-statistics for wins is equal to -8.901 (prob<0.0001).  
Note: A simple OLS regression with 141 observations also shows that drivers or mechanics 
are more likely to achieve podiums during their career than managers or engineers 
(significant at 0.05 level). 
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In our dataset, the mean propensity to gain a podium position is 0.14 and the 
standard deviation is 0.34.  Therefore, on average, a constructor team has a 14% 
chance per race of winning a podium.  
 
The mean values in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 reveal that the most successful 
leaders were former drivers closely followed by mechanics.  Drivers are associated 
with a winning team in 7% of races, and they garner a podium position in 17% of 
races.  The performance of teams led by mechanics is similar (winning 6% of the 
time, and getting podiums 16% of the time).  Teams headed by leaders of a manager 
type obtain worse results: they win 3% of races and obtain podium positions in 12% 
of the races.  Constructor teams led by engineers fare even less well: 3% wins and 8% 
podiums.  Similar patterns are found for average pole frequency and average fastest 
lap frequency.  These findings are represented in Table 3 and Figure 1.   
 
Although the raw patterns reported in Table 3 are of interest, they should not be 
interpreted in too literal a way. The data provide a preliminary summary without 
accounting for any control variables. Those variables potentially have an important 
impact on teams’ performance and, therefore, may interact with leaders’ types. 
 
 
4. Econometric Analysis and Results 
In this section we use econometric analysis to test the hypotheses in Section 2.  
 
4.1 The impact of leader types on organizational performance 
We explore whether constructor teams’ performance in F1 depends on leaders’ 
types.  In each of the regressions, the dependent variable is a measure of the 
performance of the team based on the final position of each car in every race. The 
key explanatory variable is a leader’s classification (that is: manager, driver, 
mechanic or engineer).  Finally we include control variables for each constructor, the 
race track, the number of cars competing and each race year.  
 
As reported earlier, the raw data revealed a simple pattern: that two leader-types 
appear to be associated with the most wins and podium positions.  We therefore 
begin with a preliminary analysis by dividing the data into these two groups: drivers 
and mechanics, and managers and engineers.  We begin with a simple ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimator.  Model 1 in Table 4(a) reports an OLS regression model 
without control variables and then provides results with controls in Models 2-5. 
Table 4(a) treats the data in a cardinal way and estimates an ordinary least squares 
linear probability model.  The dependent variable  ∈ 0,1 records whether a 
particular car 	 has won a podium in a race ( = 1) or did not win a podium in the 
race ( = 0). 
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Table 4(a): Regression results where the dependent variable is whether a car gets a 
podium position – estimated by an OLS linear probability model  
Explanatory variable 
Model 1 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Model 2 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Model 3 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Model 4 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Model 5 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Driver or mechanic 
   0.066*** 
(0.005) 
    0.066*** 
(0.005) 
   0.066*** 
(0.005) 
    0.042*** 
(0.008) 
    0.044*** 
(0.0083) 
Manager or engineer - - - - - 
      
CIRCUIT dummies included NO YES YES YES YES 
YEAR dummies included NO NO YES YES YES 
TEAM dummies included NO NO NO YES YES 
# CARS included NO NO NO NO YES 
 
 
    
R
2 0.0088 0.0102 0.0103 0.1305 0.1308 
N (Observations) 17725 17725 17725 17725 17725 
N (Leaders) 141 141 141 141 141 
*** - significant at 0.001 level 
The mean of the dependent variable (gaining a podium position) is 0.14. 
 
Table 4(b): Regression results where the dependent variable is whether a car gets a 
podium position – estimated by a multilevel probit model 
Explanatory variable 
Model 1 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Model 2 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Model 3 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Model 4 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Model 5 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Driver or mechanic 
    0.418*** 
(0.039) 
   0.502*** 
(0.033) 
  0.544*** 
(0.036) 
  0.478*** 
(0.035) 
  0.384*** 
(0.036) 
Manager or engineer - - - - - 
Individual leader’s effect 
st. deviation (st. error) 
0.481 
(0.004) 
0.572 
(0.005) 
0.398 
(0.024) 
0.516 
(0.004) 
0.693 
(0.011) 
      
CIRCUIT dummies included NO YES YES YES YES 
YEAR dummies included NO NO YES YES YES 
TEAM dummies included NO NO NO YES YES 
# CARS included NO NO NO NO YES 
 
 
    
Log likelihood (LL)
 -5979.23 -5972.18 -5956.03 -5947.43 -5926.49 
N (Observations) 17725 17725 17725 17725 17725 
N (Leaders) 141 141 141 141 141 
*** - significant at 0.001 level 
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The remaining columns of Table 4(a) report specifications after we add control 
variables to the basic regression analysis.  These include the circuit where the race is 
taking place, the year of competition, the constructor team a particular car 
represents, and finally, the total number of cars that participate in the race.  
 
Column 2 of Table 4(a) reveals that after controlling for the circuit, it is drivers and 
mechanics compared with managers and engineers that are associated with a higher 
propensity of winning a podium position: the t statistic is 12.50 (p<0.001).  In 
columns 3-5 as we add more controls for the year of competition, constructor team 
dummies, and number of cars in each race, the results remain stable.  Overall, Table 
4(a) shows that drivers and mechanics are associated with better organizational 
performance compared with managers and engineers. 
 
Results of the basic analysis reported in Table 4(a) do not allow us to single out how 
much of an effect individual leaders’ unobserved heterogeneity has on the 
propensity of constructor teams to gain podium positions controlling for leader 
types.  The dataset has a specific form: each leader (within each constructor team) 
enters two cars in multiple races within each year. Some leaders (constructor teams) 
compete in many seasons whereas others drop out after participating in the 
Championship for one year. Therefore, our dataset represents an unbalanced panel 
which has more than one observation for each leader within each time period.  So 
that we can incorporate individual underlying differences (unobserved 
heterogeneity) at the level of each leader -- to account for the binary nature of the 
dependent variable (winning or not winning a podium position) and to make use of 
the complex structure of our panel dataset -- we use a multilevel probit regression 
specified in the following way (see Snijders and Bosker, 1999 for details). 
 
Assume that the dichotomous dependent variable  is produced by a threshold 
model with underlying variable  given by 
 
 =  + ∑  +  +   
    (1) 
where … are explanatory variables; , … are coefficients. Variance =1 
and the variance of the random intercept  is estimated jointly with the 
coefficients. Log-likelihood is approximated using Gauss–Hermite quadrature. 
Results of the multilevel probit regression are reported in Table 4(b). 
 
Table 4(b) shows that results of the multilevel probit regression are qualitatively 
similar to the results of the simple OLS models presented in Table 4(a). Teams led by 
former drivers or mechanics are more likely to achieve podiums than teams headed 
by former managers or engineers. This suggests that the effect of driver or mechanic 
leader type on team output remains the same even when we control for the 
individual differences of leaders. 
 
We also estimate the effect of each leader type (managers, drivers, mechanics and 
engineers) separately.  We run models with unobserved individual heterogeneity at 
the level of each leader. Table 5(a) reports the results of the probit estimations 
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which include several confounding variables (shown in Table 2).  In these 
estimations, we are interested in determining the probability of team leaders with 
different backgrounds (manager, driver, mechanic, and engineer) securing a podium 
position for their teams.  The impact of leaders’ types on propensity to gain a 
podium position (1-3) is measured compared to that of manager (the omitted base 
category). 
 
Table 5(a): Regression equations where the dependent variable is whether a car 
gains a podium position - estimated by a probit model 
Explanatory variable 
Model 1 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Model 2 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Model 3 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Model 4 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
MANAGER 
    
DRIVER 
  0.202*** 
(0.040) 
  0.205*** 
(0.040) 
   0.292*** 
(0.062) 
  0.300*** 
(0.062) 
MECHANIC 
0.197*** 
(0.033) 
0.191*** 
(0.033) 
0.021 
(0.063) 
0.035 
(0.063) 
ENGINEER 
 -0.242*** 
(0.040) 
  -0.252*** 
(0.041) 
 -0.115 
(0.071) 
-0.118 
(0.072) 
 
 
  
  
CIRCUIT dummies included YES YES YES YES 
YEAR dummies included NO YES YES YES 
TEAM dummies included NO NO YES YES 
# CARS included NO NO NO YES 
     Pseudo R2 0.0156 0.0160 0.1404 0.1409 
N (Observations) 17725 17725 17725 17725 
N (Leaders) 141 141 141 141 
*** - significant at 0.001 level  
 
Table 5(b): Regression equations where the dependent variable is whether a car 
gains a podium position - estimated by a multilevel probit model  
Explanatory variable 
Model 1 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Model 2 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Model 3 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
Model 4 
coefficient 
(standard 
error) 
MANAGER 
    
DRIVER 
   0.249*** 
(0.057) 
   0.237*** 
(0.055) 
 0.134* 
(0.059) 
 0.134** 
(0.062) 
MECHANIC 
0.046 
(0.048) 
0.185*** 
(0.048) 
  0.430*** 
(0.059) 
   0.429*** 
(0.060) 
ENGINEER 
  -0.337*** 
(0.058) 
  -0.158*** 
(0.056) 
  -0.211*** 
(0.063) 
  -0.210*** 
(0.063) 
Individual leader’s effect 
st. deviation (st. error) 
0.506 
(0.004) 
0.700 
(0.011) 
0.569 
(0.007) 
0.699 
(0.010) 
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CIRCUIT dummies included YES YES YES YES 
YEAR dummies included NO YES YES YES 
TEAM dummies included NO NO YES YES 
# CARS included NO NO NO YES 
     Log-likelihood (LL) -5938.10 -5940.73 -5912.69 -5910.48 
N (Observations) 17725 17725 17725 17725 
N (Leaders) 141 141 141 141 
*  - significant at 0.05 level; ** - significant at 0.01 level; *** - significant at 0.001 level 
 
 
In Table 5(a), the probit model in Column 1 controls only for each Grand Prix circuit 
(71 circuits).  Compared to managers, teams headed by drivers are statistically more 
likely to win a podium position, irrespective of the influence of the circuit.  The 
coefficient is slightly greater than 0.20 (z-statistic 5.09, p<0.001).  Mechanic-leaders 
are a little less influential – coefficient is less than 0.20 and z-statistic 6.01, p<0.001).  
In Table 5(a) engineers have a statistically significantly negative effect on obtaining 
first, second or third place in a Grand Prix (coefficient approximately -0.24; z-statistic 
-5.99, p<0.001). 
 
Column 2 of Table 5(a) extends the set of independent variables.  It includes controls 
for both the circuit and each year in our dataset (1950 to 2011).  This new addition of 
the year dummies does not change the results appreciably.  Drivers and mechanics 
have a statistically significant effect on the probability of a podium position, whereas 
engineers have a negative influence. 
 
The results change noticeably in the specification of Column 3 in Table 5(a).  Here we 
include constructor dummies.  Teams like Ferrari show up strongly – with large 
coefficients.  Between 1950 and 2011 Ferrari won 16 World Constructors 
Championships – more than any other team in the history of F1.  The constructors’ 
effects on race performance are evident in the seven-fold increase in the pseudo-R2 
which rises in Table 5(a) from approximately 0.02 in Columns 1 and 2, to 0.14 after 
the addition of team fixed-effects. 
 
Column 3 of Table 5(a) illustrates an important finding: drivers now have a 
statistically significant and positive effect on the probability of a podium position; 
the effect of mechanic-leaders is now insignificant, while engineer-leaders remain 
negative and insignificant.  In this estimation, the coefficient on drivers goes up 
slightly and equals to approximately 0.29 (z-statistic 4.71, p<0.001).  The results in 
the last column of Table 5(a), with the inclusion of the fourth potential confounding 
variable -- the number of cars qualifying in each race -- remains similar to those in 
Column 3.  We check the robustness of our results by estimating several multilevel 
probit models. These results are qualitatively similar, but quantitatively different, to 
those reported in Table 5(b).   
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In Table 5(b), the coefficient on Mechanic is now considerably larger, at 0.429.  These 
results are now reminiscent of the simple patterns in the raw data earlier, where 
both drivers and mechanics were associated with better performance.  The fact that 
the coefficients move around suggests that it may be asking too much of the data to 
expect to isolate persuasively the exact sizes of the effect for the four different 
categories.  
 
4.2 The impact of the length of leader’s racing experience on performance 
The findings in Tables 4-5 suggest that former drivers and mechanics are statistically 
more likely to lead their constructor teams to win podium positions.  Our hypothesis 
that improved performance is associated with leader-characteristics that most 
closely align with the core business activity can now be examined in a new test.  Here 
the focus is on the number of years leaders spent in competitive racing.   This might 
be viewed as akin to executive tenure, which the upper echelons literature suggests 
can be used as a proxy for a number of factors (for example, cognition, knowledge, 
interest and power), that influence a leader’s decision making and performance 
(Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991).  The results from our time-in-industry estimations 
are reported in Table 6.   
 
We identify those leaders who have ever had competitive driving experience.  Thirty-
five leaders (24%), from a total of 141 in our dataset, are classified as drivers; 
however, 45 leaders (33%) have driven competitively at some point in their life (this 
number includes 35 former drivers, 7 mechanics, 2 managers, and 1 engineer).  To 
explore whether such experience might be the main determining factor of a team’s 
success, we conduct several econometric estimations.  
 
A potential concern is unobserved heterogeneity of leaders on performance (that is, 
leaders may differ in subtle ways that are not easily measured by statistical 
investigators).  This study proposes to solve this problem by conducting a random-
intercept logit regression. The dependent variable is binary  ∈ 0,1 and 
represents podium or no podium position gained at time  by constructor team 	. 
The probability that team 	 wins a podium position in period  ∈  1, !" is given by: 
 
#$ = 1% = &'()*+,-
./*0,-./⋯/*2,3-./4-5
/&'()*+,-./*0,-./⋯/*2,3-./4-5
   (2), 
 
where 6789 is the leader’s years of experience as a competitive driver in the past and 
6:89…6;89 are explanatory variables described in 3, <7…<; are marginal effects 
and =8 is a vector capturing unobserved individual heterogeneity at the level of 
every leader in each season. The conditional log-likelihood function of the random 
intercept logit regression has the following form: 
 
>> = ∏ @ ∏ A &'()*+,-./*0,-./⋯/*2,3-./4-5/&'()*+,-./*0,-./⋯/*2,3-./4-5B
C
/D
ED
F G$H%IH (3) 
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The log-likelihood function (2) is approximated using the Newton-Raphson method.6 
Results of the random intercept logit regressions estimated with different number of 
explanatory variables are reported in Table 6 where the dependent variable is 
obtaining a podium position. 
 
Table 6: Regression equations where the dependent variable is whether a car gains 
a podium position -- estimated by random intercept logit model -- in the subsample 
 of leaders who have ever had competitive driving experience¹
Explanatory variable 
Model 1 
marginal 
effect 
(standard 
error) 
Model 2 
marginal 
effect 
(standard 
error) 
Model 3 
marginal 
effect 
(standard 
error) 
Model 4 
marginal 
effect 
(standard 
error) 
Model 5 
marginal 
effect 
(standard 
error) 
Leader’s years of experience 
as a competitive driver in 
the past 
    0.106***   
(0.012) 
    0.115*** 
(0.014) 
    0.113*** 
(0.013) 
    0.072***   
(0.021) 
    0.073***   
(0.022) 
Leader in each season 
individual effect:st. 
deviation (st. error) 
1.854 
(0.302) 
1.833 
(0.276) 
1.598 
(0.220) 
1.050 
(0.127) 
1.103 
(0.135) 
CIRCUIT dummies included NO YES YES YES YES 
YEAR dummies included NO NO YES YES YES 
TEAM dummies included NO NO NO YES YES 
# CARS included NO NO NO NO YES 
 
 
    
Log likelihood (LL)
 -1617.88 -1596.03 -1599.18 -1494.93 -1494.93 
N (Observations) 6061 6061 6061 6061 6061 
N (Leaders) 45 45 45 45 45 
*** - significant at 0.001 level  
 
¹ The data include 45 leaders out of 141 (33%) who have entered 6,061 cars in 803 out of 858 
races in F1 competitions between 1950 and 2011. These are leaders who have ever had a 
competitive driving experience. Out of them, 35 are classified as drivers, 7 as mechanics, 2 as 
managers, and 1 as engineer. 
 
 
Interestingly, in Table 6, the length of the previous experience of the leader has a 
positive effect on performance in all estimations.  Overall, leaders’ unobserved 
heterogeneity within each race accounts for about 30% of variation in winning a 
podium position when we do not control for the constructor team (e.g., standard 
deviation of variability of leader’s individual effects are equal to 0.302 in Model 1 in 
Table 6.  However, once we add controls for the constructor teams, the individual 
effect of each leader within each race decreases significantly suggesting that 
accounting for constructor team is very important (e.g., standard deviation of 
variability of leader’s individual effects are equal to 0.135 in Model 5 in Table 6. 
 
                                                 
6
 The estimation has been conducted using the GLLAMM plug-in for the Stata 10.0 package. 
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A further check is whether there is a home-race effect.  One of our regression 
variables allows us to control for the impact of a specific circuit. The home-race 
effect accounts for the possibility that constructors may have competitive advantage 
if the race circuit is located in the same country where the team headquarters is 
located.  Constructors may be more likely to win a podium position in their home 
country (country where their headquarters are located).  To control for the home-
race effect, we first compare the frequencies of winning a home race versus winning 
a race abroad for our entire sample of car entries.  We find no relationship between 
the average frequency of winning a podium position at home as compared with 
abroad.7 
 
4.3 The impact of the leader on the key follower – the driver 
To this point, the analysis has suggested that the length of leader’s previous 
experience in competitive driving has a significant positive impact on organizational 
performance in F1 constructor teams: the higher is a leader’s experience as a driver 
in the past, the more likely his team is to win a podium position in a given race. Yet, 
it is interesting to consider the impact of leader’s previous experience on team 
performance not only separately, but also in conjunction with the performance of 
key followers (drivers who compete for the team).  
 
In recent years, constructor teams compete with two cars in each Grand Prix race; 
however, the number of cars per team has varied throughout F1 history between 1 
and 2. Since each observation in our dataset is a car entry, driven by a particular F1 
driver and representing a specific F1 constructor team, which takes part in the F1 
Constructor Championship, we can look at a combination of leader-driver 
performance for each entry in our dataset. We consider the length of a leader’s 
experience as a competitive driver in the past in conjunction with the length of 
experience of drivers who currently compete for this leader’s team. We look at each 
current driver’s experience as a competitive driver in F1.8 
 
For one leader in the dataset, it was not possible to identify drivers.  We have thus 
excluded those 7 car entries from the analysis. Therefore, the resulting data for the 
analysis of leader-driver experience combinations consisted of 140 leaders, 662 
drivers, and 17,718 car entries.  
 
In the remaining dataset, there is considerable individual heterogeneity in terms of 
length of experience both among 140 leaders (the length of experience ranges from 
no experience to 17 years of experience with the mean of 7.3 years, standard 
deviation of 5.1 years and the median of 7 years) and 662 drivers (the length of 
experience also ranges from no experience to 17 years of experience with the mean 
of 3.8 years, standard deviation of 3.4 years and the median of 3 years). In order to 
simplify the analysis and construct a sensible number of leader-driver experience 
                                                 
7
 Tables and estimations reporting this result are available from the authors upon request. 
8
 Note that while a leader’s experience is measured as number of years a leader participated in various 
competitions (not only F1) as a competitive driver before becoming an F1 team principal. At the same 
time, a current driver’s experience is measured as an experience of a particular driver in F1 competition 
to the date of a given race. 
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combinations, we identify 3 cohorts of leaders and 3 cohorts of drivers dependent 
on the length of their experience. 
 
We distinguish between the following cohorts of leaders: 
• Leader None (dr) – leader’s previous experience as a competitive driver is 
equal to 0 years; 
• Leader Medium (dr) – leader’s previous experience as a competitive driver is 
equal to 1 to 5 years; 
• Leader Long (dr) – leader’s previous experience as a competitive driver is 
greater than 5 years. 
At the same time, we identify 3 cohorts of drivers: 
• Driver None – driver’s previous experience as a competitive driver in Formula 
1 is equal to 0 years; 
• Driver Medium – driver’s previous experience as a competitive driver in 
Formula 1 is equal to 1 to 5 years; 
• Driver Long – driver’s previous experience as a competitive driver in Formula 
1 is greater than 5 years 
 
While each leader’s cohort does not change throughout the dataset (because we 
take into account leaders’ experience before they have become principals in F1), 
drivers may move from the cohort DN to the cohort DM and then to the cohort DL 
throughout the dataset (because they gain experience from one year to the next as 
long as they stay in F1). Given these cohorts, we can identify 9 combinations of 
leader-driver experiences: 
 
1. LN(dr)-DN: 1654 (9%) experience combinations from 1950 to 2011; 
2. LN(dr)-DM: 615 (3%) experience combinations from 1950 to 2011; 
3. LN(dr)-DL: 530 (3%) experience combinations from 1950 to 2011; 
4. LM(dr)-DN: 6710 (38%) experience combinations from 1950 to 2011; 
5. LM(dr)-DM: 1547 (9%) experience combinations from 1950 to 2011; 
6. LM(dr)-DL: 2020 (11%) experience combinations from 1950 to 2011; 
7. LL(dr)-DN: 3296 (19%) experience combinations from 1950 to 2011; 
8. LL(dr)-DM: 276 (2%) experience combinations from 1950 to 2011; 
9. LL(dr)-DL: 1070 (6%) experience combinations from 1950 to 2011. 
 
To explore the extent to which these effects are observed in the data, we conduct a 
clustered conditional logit regression without and with control variables (circuit 
individual effects, year of competition, constructor individual effects, number of cars 
in a race).  The dependent variable is the correlation between podiums and 
combinations of leader-driver experience (a categorical variable with base category 
combination LN(dr)-DN).  Standard errors are clustered at the level of each individual 
leader (140 clusters in our dataset).  Results of these clustered logit regressions are 
reported in Table 7. 
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Table 7: Results of clustered conditional logit regression without and with controls 
(correlation between podiums and combinations of leader-driver experience). 
Leader’s experience is measured as leader’s previous experience as competitive 
driver. 
Base category: combination LN(dr)-DN. 
[Dependent variable: whether a car won a podium position or not] 
 
Combination 
Model 1 
coefficient 
(robust 
standard 
error) 
Model 2 
coefficient 
(robust 
standard 
error) 
Model 3 
coefficient 
(robust 
standard 
error) 
Model 4 
coefficient 
(robust 
standard 
error) 
Model 1 
coefficient 
(robust 
standard 
error) 
      
LN(dr)-DN 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
LN(dr)-DM 
-0.6589917   
(0.7469524) 
-0.6775477   
(0.7252807) 
-0.6620999   
(0.7095704) 
-0.2799302   
(0.4221312) 
-0.2731413   
(0.4182238) 
LN(dr)-DL 
-
2.092188***    
(0.415654) 
-
2.048483***   
(0.4251668) 
-
1.986393***   
(0.4528088) 
-0.7888245    
(0.549179) 
-0.7760258    
(0.538188) 
LM(dr)-DN 
1.037523***   
(0.1839944) 
1.066706***   
(0.1802005) 
1.089532***   
(0.1794364) 
0.6934863**
*   
(0.2026239) 
0.695632***   
(0.2015751) 
LM(dr)-DM 
0.8386818†   
(0.4902904) 
0.8324678†    
(0.478085) 
0.8398051†   
(0.4633605) 
0.8348534*    
(0.396006) 
0.8328638*   
(0.3944819) 
LM(dr)-DL 
0.7735891†   
(0.4166392) 
0.8230227*    
(0.425948) 
0.8759659*   
(0.4386714) 
1.312192***   
(0.2432113) 
1.324331***   
(0.2390952) 
LL(dr)-DN 
1.353978***   
(0.1951035) 
1.408388***   
(0.1784429) 
1.45925***   
(0.1730723) 
0.8919771**
*   
(0.2145238) 
0.9091598**
*   
(0.2125711) 
LL(dr)-DM 
0.565194   
(0.7308702) 
0.5926472   
(0.7375657) 
0.6422772    
(0.728222) 
0.8009291   
(0.5251208) 
0.8203238   
(0.5367398) 
LL(dr)-DL 
1.474793*   
(0.7149445) 
1.518909*   
(0.7060216) 
1.594736*   
(0.7115901) 
1.529971***   
(0.3816751) 
1.525973***   
(0.3739136) 
      
CIRCUIT dummies included NO YES YES YES YES 
YEAR dummies included NO NO YES YES YES 
TEAM dummies included NO NO NO YES YES 
# CARS included NO NO NO NO YES 
      
Pseudo R2 0.0322 0.0348 0.0358 0.1497 0.1500 
      
N (Observations) 17718 17718 17718 17718 17718 
Clustered at the level of 
individual leader 
(140 clusters) 
YES YES YES YES YES 
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Abbreviations: LN(dr) – leader’s previous experience as competitive driver is equal to 0 
years; 
LM(dr) – leader’s previous experience as competitive driver is equal to 1 to 5 years; 
LL(dr) – leader’s previous experience as competitive driver is greater than 5 years; 
DN – driver’s previous experience as competitive driver in Formula 1 is equal to 0 years; 
DM – driver’s previous experience as competitive driver in Formula 1 is equal to 1 to 5 years; 
DL– driver’s previous experience as competitive driver in Formula 1 is greater than 5 years 
Significance: † - significant at 0.10 level; * - significant at 0.05 level; ** - significant at 0.01 
level; *** - significant at 0.001 level 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Matrix showing the interaction between leaders’ racing experience and 
the F1 racing experience of their current team drivers 
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According to Table 7, the combination LL(dr)-DL is more likely to win a podium 
position than any other combination. Combinations where leaders have medium or 
long previous driving experience are more likely to reach podiums than combinations 
where leaders do not have previous driving experience.  Furthermore, regression 
results suggest that leaders’ experience as a competitive driver in the past seems to 
matter more than the F1 racing experience of the current drivers. In Model 5 with all 
4 control variables, the coefficients for combinations with LN(dr) range between -
0.78 to -0.27, whereas the coefficients for combinations with LM(dr) range between 
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0.83 and 1.32 and coefficients for combinations with LL(dr) range between 0.82 and 
1.53.9  
 
The results tell us that highly experienced leaders paired with highly experienced 
drivers (combination LL(dr)-DL) gain podiums in 21% of cases (more frequently than 
any other leader-driver combination).  However, it is notable that when a highly 
experienced leader is paired with a rookie driver (combination LL(dr)-DN), the team 
reaches podium positions in 19% of cases.  This finding is noteworthy because it 
suggests, first, that only a small difference exists between pairing an experienced F1 
driver with a driver-leader (2%), and, second, that leaders with previous driving 
experience work more effectively with rookie drivers than with those who have 1 to 
5 years of driving experience in F1.  For ease of comprehension, the regression 
results have been represented in a matrix in Figure 2.   
 
 
5. Discussion 
The evidence presented above reveals that over the six decades of the Formula One 
global industry it is leaders who were former drivers who had the greatest later 
success.   To understand why and how driver-leaders might affect performance is an 
empirical issue; our dataset does not allow us to causally uncover the underlying 
details of the transfer processes.  Nevertheless, it is interesting to raise further 
questions and possible explanations that might be considered in future empirical 
work (Goodall & Bäker 2013).   
 
Our data exclude important information -- for example, management skills, which 
are positively associated with organizational performance (Bloom & Van Reenen, 
2007; Bloom, Genakos, Martin & Sadun, 2010).  It is natural to assume that F1 
principals vary in their individual management and leadership skills.   
 
Might drivers make better leaders because of (unmeasured) personality as opposed 
to expert knowledge?10  This is an important conceptual possibility and it seems 
valuable that future research attempt to scrutinize it in depth.  But a number of 
pieces of evidence currently appear to point against such an interpretation.  
 
It is not feasible to measure the personality types of each driver -- many of whom are 
no longer alive -- in this historical dataset.  However, one reason to be cautious 
about the hypothesis of an overwhelming influence from personality is that former 
mechanics also perform well as F1 principals.  It is not clear why the personality of 
mechanics and drivers would be similar to each other.  Second, and perhaps more 
important, within the sub-sample of everyone who ever drove we find that 
individuals with the longest racing experience make the best leaders.  This seems 
powerfully suggestive of the role of mature expertise rather than solely of 
personality (though personality might be somewhat implicated in the ability to be 
driver for a large rather than medium number of years).  When a leader has 10 years 
                                                 
9
 The same results are obtained in regressions where the dependent variable is the propensity to win a 
race. 
10
 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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of racing experience instead of zero years, it translates, according to the data, into a 
16 percentage points higher probability of the leader’s team gaining a podium 
position – this is after controlling for the race circuit, the race year, each constructor, 
and the number of cars that qualified.  If race drivers have similar personality traits 
we would not expect such large differences within the group.  Finally, we can run an 
empirical test that may add weight to the arguments in support of knowledge over 
sheer personality.  We can ask: do drivers who are in constructor teams led by 
former-drivers, versus other leaders, crash less or more in Grand Prix races?   We 
find that cars in teams led by leaders with no previous driving experience on average 
a crash in 12%-15% of cases, whereas cars in teams led by leaders with high levels of 
experience crash in 10%-13% of cases11.  Caution is necessary here when drawing 
conclusions, but one interpretation is that this interaction result may be explained by 
expert knowledge -- in a way quite independent of personality -- that is transferred 
from the leader to the way the team performs. 
 
The core business activity in F1 is racing to win championship points.  We label 
expert leaders as those whose knowledge and experience aligns with the 
organization’s core business activity.  Examples include: university presidents who 
have strong research records who lead research universities (Goodall 2009a,b); 
basketball coaches who were themselves star players in the NBA (Goodall, Kahn & 
Oswald. 2011), and so on.   We suggest that former drivers are highly competent in 
the core business activity of racing.   
 
That drivers are important to F1 constructors is evident in their wages12.  It is usual 
for drivers to receive the highest salaries in F1 teams.   Drivers occupy a unique 
position in the team because they can view all elements of the F1 process; it is the 
drivers who feed back information about new adaptations to the chassis, engine, 
tires and other car modifications after races.  Drivers also form relationships with all 
parts of the team and they are often involved with raising money; indeed some are 
required to come with their own sponsorship package.   
 
It is normal for drivers to begin racing at an early age, usually after go-karting as 
children.  Because of their early competitive start, drivers may develop both 
technical knowledge and driving tactics that are combined with an ability to make 
decisions under time pressure and stress.  It might also be presumed that a leader 
who has spent time undertaking the core business activity would have a good 
understanding about the requisite conditions required for other core workers.  Thus, 
we might expect driver-leaders to create an appropriate work environment, which in 
turn may influence employee performance.  This is supported by findings from the 
creativity literature that suggests leaders need technical expertise to evaluate the 
ideas of other creative people and provide appropriate feedback (summarized by 
Mumford et al., 2000; Basadur, Runco, & Vega, 2000).   
 
                                                 
11
 We use a Kruskal-Wallis test and find statistically significance at 0.0004 level.  Due to space 
restrictions we have not included a table.  
12
 Salaries for 2013 available at: http://www.tsmplug.com/richlist/highest-paid-formula-1-drivers/ 
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Former drivers who lead may also act as role models within the team, and may be 
more likely to coax high performance out of others.  In the context of North 
American professional basketball, Goodall et al. (2011) argued that having been a 
former top basketball player helps those who become coaches to better manage the 
egos of their top players.  Finally, because of their proven track record, former 
drivers may command more respect; they may be viewed as intrinsically credible 
since they have ‘walked-the-walk’.  Credibility, it is argued, legitimizes leaders’ 
authority and extends their influence (Bass, 1985; Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Kouzes & 
Posner, 2003).   
 
This study contributes to the growing literature examining the influence of leaders 
on organizational performance. A number of scholars have claimed that leaders have 
a sizeable effect (Thomas 1988; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Waldman & 
Yammarino, 1999; Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Jones and Olken 2005; Bennedsen, 
Perez-Gonzalez and Wolfenzon 2007; Yukl, 2008; Pogrebna et al., 2011; Kocher, 
Pogrebna & Sutter, 2013; Souder, Simsek & Johnson, 2012; Dezs & Ross, 2012).  In 
this literature the explanatory power from CEOs has typically ranged from 4% 
(Thomas, 1988) to 15% (Wasserman et al., 2010) up to 30% (Mackey, 2008).  Here 
we also find large effects.  The influence of former drivers, the most successful 
leaders in our study, explains 17% (in the raw data) of organizational performance 
(podium position, 1-3).   
 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper takes a new step to understand the boundaries of the expert leader 
hypothesis by testing it in an extreme high-technology turbulent industry -- a setting 
where leadership has not before been examined.  Formula One could be viewed as 
the iconic, modern, hyper-competitive, global industry.  The dataset that we 
collected for this study provides longitudinal information on that industry’s entire 
history.  The dataset also offers the unusual advantage of half a century of objective 
organizational outcomes against which to determine the kinds of leaders associated 
with optimal performance.  The F1 industry is important financially ($6 billion 
turnover per annum) and competition on the track generates new technologies that 
spill over into many parts of the economy.  
 
We have information on every leader in the 62 year history of Formula One, 1950-
2011.  Four leader classifications emerge from our data: engineers who have 
degrees, managers who come from industries outside F1, mechanics, and former 
racing drivers.  We test our propositions, described in section 2, using econometric 
methods. These methods allow us to compare teams’ performance and determine 
whether and to what extent leaders’ competence in the core business activity 
(especially driving) affects later team performance.  We include a number of control 
variables in the analyses -- the race circuit, the race year, the different constructors 
(Ferrari, McLaren, Red Bull etc.), and the number of cars qualified.  In general, teams 
have historically not released information about their budgets.  However, we 
identified teams’ financial investment for a small number of years, and we show that 
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inclusion in our equations of a variable for the constructor’s budget does not affect 
the study’s key findings.   
 
Managers and engineers on average perform least successfully as F1 team leaders.  
Principals who were mechanics performed well, though less well overall compared 
with former drivers.  In our regression tables we find, first, that F1 leaders who were 
former racing drivers and mechanics are associated with the most success in winning 
podium positions in Grand Prix races.  Second, among the sub-sample of leaders who 
have ever driven competitively, it is leaders who spent the most years racing -- 
arguably the most successful drivers -- who secure the best results for their F1 
teams.   We argue that a long racing career might be viewed as an equivalent to, or 
proxy for, executive tenure or time-in-industry.  The size of the estimated effect is 
noteworthy: 10 years of experience instead of zero years is associated with an extra 
0.16 on the dependent variable.  That translates into a 16 percentage point higher 
probability of the leader’s team winning a podium position (after the inclusion of 
control variables for race track, race year, constructor type, and number of cars).  
The extra probability of gaining a podium position when a driver has had a decade’s 
experience of competitive racing is about one-in-seven, which corresponds to a 
doubling of the effect compared with the mean podium frequency in the data of 
0.14.   
 
Finally, and perhaps notably, we attempt to discern the effects that different leaders 
have on what might be considered their key employees – the team drivers.  To do 
this, we interact leaders’ formers driving experience with the F1 racing experience of 
the current team driver.  The evidence suggests that in most circumstances the 
driving experience of the principal matters more to team performance than the F1 
driving experience of the current driver.  A highly experienced driver-leader paired 
with a highly experienced F1 driver gains podiums in 21% of cases (more frequently 
than any other leader-driver combination).  However, when a highly experienced 
driver-leader is paired with a rookie driver, the team reaches podium positions in 
19% of cases.  This finding seems striking because it suggests, first, that only a small 
difference exists between pairing an experienced F1 driver with a driver-leader (2%), 
and, second, that leaders with previous driving experience work more effectively 
with rookie drivers than with those who have 1 to 5 years of driving experience in F1.   
Leaders who have never raced have the least influence, no matter how much F1 
racing experience their driver previously achieved.  This is an interesting result 
because it is a sharp signal that leaders matter.   
Within the limitations of our historical dataset we cannot explain precisely why the 
F1 leaders who were drivers outperformed other leaders in the six decades of F1.  
Nevertheless, we discuss possible explanations.  For example, we suggest that 
drivers sit in a unique position that allows them to view every part of the F1 process.  
Drivers begin racing as children; they learn how to formulate driving tactics and 
acquire extensive technical knowledge from an early age.  Former drivers may also 
appear more credible to members of their teams, and those ex-drivers may know, 
from their deep acquired experience, how to create an appropriate work 
environment for other team members.   
 
  
WMG Service Systems Research Group Working Paper Series – 08/13                                                   
 
 
30
Caution is advisable in the interpretation of any observational study in social science.  
It is sensible to recall that -- though we have here the entire longitudinal history of 
Formula One and not a snap-shot -- at this level of disaggregation any leader sub-
samples necessarily become relatively small.  Hence care is needed in the 
assessment of results.  Despite such limitations, our findings have made it possible to 
consider the expert leader hypothesis in a new real-world setting; this iconic 
backdrop helps us to understand further its strengths, boundaries, and possible 
generalizability.  We believe the issues merit further attention.    
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Appendix 1 
 
Summary of F1 performance: Twelve most successful teams 1950 – 2006* 
 
*Table reproduced from Jenkins, 2010, p 901. 
  
Team 
Period of winning  
Grand Prix 
Number of Grand 
Prix wins 
Number of win 
periods  
Ferrari 1951 - 2006 186 7 
McLaren 1968 - 2006 148 5 
Williams 1979 - 2004 112 5 
Lotus 1960 - 1987 79 4 
Brabham 1964 - 1985 35 3 
Renault (2 entries) 
1979 - 1983;  
2003 - 2006 
33 3 
Benetton 1986 - 1997 28 3 
Tyrrell 1971 - 1983 23 2 
BRM 1962 - 1972 17 3 
Cooper 1958 - 1967 16 3 
Alfa Romeo 1950 - 1951 10 1 
Matra 1968 - 1969 10 1 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
Table 8: Clustered OLS regression results where the dependent variable is whether  
a car gains a podium position  
[estimated for 2 years only where budget data are available: 2006 and 2008]  
(clustered by year) 
 
Explanatory 
variable 
Model 1 
coefficient 
(robust 
standard 
error) 
  
DRIVER or 
MECHANIC 
0.0987* 
(0.0075) 
# CARS included 
0.0081* 
(0.0003) 
TEAM BUDGETS 
0.0016** 
(0.000003) 
Constant 
-0.3782* 
(0.0091) 
  
R
2 0.0728 
N (Observations) 764 
N (Clusters = Years) 2 
* - significant at 0.05 level;  
** - significant at 0.01 level 
 
 
Notes: We have obtained estimates of budgets for the years of 2006 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formula_One) and 2008 
(http://www.f1fanatic.co.uk/2008/09/22/toyota-has-biggest-f1-budget-4456m/) and 
conducted OLS clustered OLS regression where we excluded individual leader and team 
effects but included obtained budget information. This budget information is not official 
figures (which are a part of each team’s commercial secret and therefore are not obtainable) 
but expert estimates. Our results (presented above) show that even when the team effects 
are not included, having former driver or mechanic as the head of the team influences team 
performance more than the team budget. Particularly, while former driver or mechanic 
leader (rather than former manager or engineer) increases the propensity of team winning a 
podium position by 9.87%, higher budget increases the chances of winning a podium by only 
0.16%. This suggests that our results remain stable even when we include budget estimates 
in our regressions. 
